1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 2 NASHVILLE DIVISION 3 4 CONCORD MUSIC GROUP, INC. 5 VS No. 3:23-cv-0606 6 X CORP 7 8 9 10 BEFORE THE HONORABLE BARBARA D. HOLMES, 11 MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 TRANSCRIPT OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING 13 January 6, 2025 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2.1 PREPARED FROM ELECTRONIC RECORDING BY: Roxann Harkins, RPR, CRR 22 Official Court Reporter 719 Church Street, Ste 2300 Nashville, TN 37203 23 2.4 615.403.8314 roxann_harkins@tnmd.uscourts.gov 25

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The above-styled cause came to be heard on January 6, 2025, before the Hon. BARBARA D. HOLMES, Magistrate Judge, when the following proceedings were had to-wit:

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THE COURT: Go ahead and have a seat, everyone. We are here in the matter of Concord Music Group, Inc. versus X Corp, No. 3:23-cv-00606. Let me go ahead and get appearances, please.

MR. RILEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Steve Riley representing the plaintiffs. I'm here with my partner, Grace Peck, and Scott Zebrak and Meredith Stewart. Scott and Meredith are from Washington, DC.

THE COURT: Very good. Thank you,

Mr. Riley.

MR. HARBISON: Morning, Your Honor. Jay
Harbison from Neal & Harwell for the defendant. With me
this afternoon are Mr. Dylan Scher and Andrew Shapiro
from Quinn Emanuel. Mr. Scher is from New York, and
Mr. Shapiro is from Chicago.

THE COURT: Very good. Welcome, everyone.

All right. The purpose of this afternoon's

proceeding is for a hearing on the discovery dispute that was referred from Judge Trauger. I have read the parties' papers, reviewed the discovery requests that were made in dispute. And thank you for your update, updated filing regarding resolution of some of the matters that were previously in dispute. And I am ready to hear any additional argument that you'd like to make.

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I don't need to have a great amount of detailed argument. I understand the issues and it doesn't seem to me that they are that complicated to resolve, but I'm always happy to hear if there's something else that you would like to add to the filings that have already been made in the case.

So I suppose since this is really the plaintiff's request, somewhat in the nature of a motion to compel to -- at least compel the more complete responses to the discovery. Let me go ahead and hear first from whomever's going to argue on behalf of the plaintiff, then. You can come on up to the podium.

MR. ZEBRAK: Thank you, Your Honor. My name is Scott Zebrak, as Mr. Riley just indicated. And, first of all, thank you for seeing us today. I know the Court's read the papers, so I'd like to just start by asking if there's any specific questions or anything you'd like me to address, otherwise I'll just hit some

key points.

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THE COURT: I do have a couple of questions, so thank you, Mr. Zebrak. And maybe what makes more sense to do is just to wait until — because most of my questions were about some of the later discovery requests. And the question is, largely, to have both you and whomever's going to speak on behalf of the defendant, explain to me what you think the difference is between the two proposals. Because I'm sure there is some difference or distinction, but it's not immediately apparent from the — from Exhibit A.

So maybe it just makes more sense for you to go ahead and go through whatever remarks you were going to make and then, as we get to those specific discovery requests and responses, I'll raise those questions.

MR. ZEBRAK: Very well, Your Honor. Thank you.

So as the Court's aware, the parties have had quite substantial back and forth, and we've already reached a number of compromises. With respect to the matters that remain for resolution today, primarily we're here over a dispute about relevance. Obviously concepts of proportionality, you know, bear upon what the ultimate production will be, but as -- I hope Your Honor will see as I walk through these requests in a moment, we think

the other -- the other side's complying with what some courts have referred to as a smoking gun standard.

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Albeit a sensational term, what that, of course, means is that what some parties do is they say documents are irrelevant and don't need to be produced unless they're a smoking gun. And in many ways that's what's happening here, where the defendant's saying, unless a particular piece of discovery is going to establish one of the elements of affirmative liability, there's no relevance to it. And, of course, relevance is a much broader standard than that. And the application of how defendant proposes to proceed here would really deprive the Court, the jury and plaintiffs of key evidence in the case.

THE COURT: I think you can take some level of satisfaction, Mr. Zebrak, in what I'm about to say, which is that I do not think in this case, or in any other case, frankly, that the standard for discovery in federal litigation is a smoking gun one. It is a very broad standard of discoverability.

And in some respects the limited cases that were cited in the parties' joint discovery dispute statement fall into the same trap, pothole, whatever metaphor you want to use, that they are not cases that necessarily with discovery -- I understand why the

plaintiff cited those cases because they deal with standards. But very often parties, as has the defendant here, cites to cases in which the issue is admissibility of evidence for trial purposes or summary judgment purposes or their case on appeal where a summary judgment was reversed because of improperly-relied-upon evidence. And those are very different standards, as you know. The standard for admissibility and discoverability are two very different standards. And I am not going to consider cases in which the evidence may have been included at trial or excluded for summary judgment purposes, either before or after a motion for summary judgment was considered. I am going to apply the very broad standards for relevancy.

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And I think in this case you-all are even one step further than that because Judge Trauger has already told you what she thinks are relevant for purposes in this case, and it is not -- I guess that is my frustration with the amount of time that is being spent on this discovery dispute.

Because Judge Trauger has already said that notwithstanding her dismissal of two of the kinds of claims of Counts One and Three, that she clearly said that X Corp's powers of monitoring and control over users and their tweets are relevant to the inquiry of whether

what and to what extent X Corp may be liable for the infringing acts of users on its platform, as are X Corp's economic incentives to tolerate infringement, whether or not one resorts to the concept of vicarious rather than contributory infringement.

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And the Court's decision to permit Count Two to proceed with regard to certain challenged policies means that those issues are still part of the case.

She's already made a determination that relevancy is broader just than evidence that might directly establish the elements of Count Two.

And I -- again, I am at a little bit of a loss to understand why we are here today, why all of the resources of the parties -- I understand why the plaintiff is here today. I guess this is really more a question for Mr. Harbison and his co-counsel about why there is so much -- so many resources and so much time being spent on an issue that seems to me to be pretty clearly within the scope of what Judge Trauger has already said is relevant discovery in this case.

So you can be assured that you don't have to spend much more time arguing to me about the --

MR. ZEBRAK: Sure.

THE COURT: -- impropriety of a smoking gun standard because I am not going to apply in this case, or

really in any case, a smoking gun standard. I understand there are courts that think that's an appropriate standard. This Court is not one of them.

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MR. ZEBRAK: Thank you, Your Honor. So just by way of sort of setting the stage a little bit before we get to the specific three categories, Judge Trauger's decision, as Your Honor's aware, addressed each of the three claims that we alleged in the case. And in going through that, Judge Trauger indicated and reinforced that the idea of liability platform-wide just for all infringement that occurs where the defendant only has general knowledge that it may be happening somewhere, that that doesn't suffice. That wasn't our allegation, and it's not our allegation.

Our allegation here for contributory infringement is about the specific infringers' infringements that we told the defendant about. But, of course, that happens. It doesn't occur in a vacuum. It occurs against the backdrop of what defendant knows about what users are doing on its platform and what it's promoting in its strategy documents.

You know, Judge Trauger didn't say that the defendant's general knowledge about use of music and the types of things users are doing with music, even if the defendant doesn't regard it as infringing, she didn't say

1 that that's all off limits. That's the kind of stuff 2 we're getting at now where -- you know, the specific 3 liability in the case may hinge on what did the defendant 4 knew about specific infringers and infringements, but for lots of issues in the case, aside from establishing those 5 6 specific elements of liability, as Judge Trauger already 7 alluded to in making clear what her decision was in 8 taking off the table, you know, from our perspective, the 9 idea that -- you know, under the defendant's logic here, 10 they would withhold documents reflecting that they know of massive infringing activity as long as they don't 11 12 regard it as infringement.

THE COURT: I don't disagree with you about that.

MR. ZEBRAK: Okay.

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THE COURT: And they're going to have to explain to me why it is that any defendant in any litigation in discovery gets to decide whether the discoverable information satisfies the ultimate elements of the claim.

MR. ZEBRAK: Yeah.

THE COURT: Because that's not the way discovery works in federal litigation.

MR. ZEBRAK: Yeah. So I'll go through the three categories quickly.

THE COURT: Sure. Let me ask you one question before you start. Is there an agreement that the relevant discovery period is from December 1 of 2021 through June 14 of 2023?

THE COURT: Or has there been an agreement to limit discovery to that period? Maybe that's the

MR. ZEBRAK: We have -- sometimes --

8 better way to pose that question.

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MR. ZEBRAK: There is a default period that we're using, and I believe Your Honor referenced it correctly. But that's not for all requests per se.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEBRAK: When it comes to certain requests, there may be reasons to go earlier. A lot of that will just be negotiated by the parties, but this dispute right now hasn't been an issue about time period at all. Thus far -- and I think the time period where that would arise would be on issues of -- if it became too burdensome and you wanted to cabin what the defendant was searching or producing to a particular time period, we'd be happy to get into that.

THE COURT: Right. Well, they've raised -the defendant has raised that issue in a -- with
respect -- at least in the original objections, in the
initial objections --

1 MR. ZEBRAK: Yes.

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THE COURT: -- raised that issue with respect to multiple of the requests that remain in dispute, but maybe that's no longer an issue. Maybe the other issues have --

MR. ZEBRAK: Yes.

THE COURT: -- sort of risen to the surface as the primary ones that will be determinative of the outcome.

MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor. Initially the defendant had very extensive objections that we've worked through in many respects, including with respect to the time period that's being applied for various requests as a default. So that's — that's not an issue for today.

Today really, I think, Your Honor -hopefully once Your Honor resolves the issue of relevance
and that something needs to be produced here, I think all
the issues will sort of resolve themselves, you know, at
that point after. You know, from our perspective -- and
I'm going to jump right into the three categories.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. ZEBRAK: You know, the defendant has, after quite some time, proposed compromises on these requests. For a long period of time it was not just producing anything. Then indicated -- it tried to modify

these requests to have it apply with respect to what it regarded as infringing content or infringing activity.

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You know, from our perspective, that's not a workable solution because, you know, whether the defendant regards it as infringing or not, of course, that's important, but that's not the ceiling on relevance. You know, the defendant can't explain what it would look for there unless, you know, they'd know it when they'd see it.

From our perspective, you know, our view is that most infringers don't call out when they know — when they know a whole category of content is highly infringing or routinely infringing. We're interested in knowing what they knew, what they did, what they were promoting, not just whether they regarded that as infringement. And so let me — if it makes sense, just jump to the three categories.

THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead.

MR. ZEBRAK: For the first category, what remains -- so the plaintiffs referred to this as monitoring and control requests. The defendant has referred to what remains at issue as content moderation requests. And this concerns one RFP and one interrogatory.

I should perhaps start with the

interrogatory because I think this is real easy. The defendant has agreed to produce an org chart with the same subject matter if it exists, but refuses to answer interrogatory to name a couple of people on the same topic. And we just think that's silly. You know, of course, if the org chart's sufficient, if they have one to produce, that would be fine, but we can't be out of luck if there isn't such a document.

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So -- but let me turn to the more -- the subject matter --

THE COURT: So go back there -- go back just a moment to what you said. The defendant's position from the November 8, 2024, letter was that X will identify persons with knowledge of programs or tools to monitor the site for copyrighted music on the platform.

So they're not agreeing to do that now?

MR. ZEBRAK: I'm sorry, perhaps I -- I

thought that would be a tidier category to start with,

but I may have done that in a way that's more confusing.

So if I could start again --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. ZEBRAK: -- that might streamline this.

The defendant's current position on the interrogatory is as Your Honor just stated. And the defendant correctly listed its current position in its

segment of the joint statement on the RFP.

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But let me tell you why the proposed narrowing of our interrogatory and RFP is problematic. The RFP is -- and I'm paraphrasing now -- it's looking for documents that are going to show or describe what -- what tools they're using or programs they have in place to monitor or control users and the content that are uploaded by users. That's the RFP. Of course, there's a spectrum of relevance. You know, what's most relevant is what they're doing and not doing in the area of copyright, but there's other -- other issues too.

So let me begin by telling the Court what we think the defendant's document response would exclude, because the defendant is indicating they're going to provide documents sufficient to reflect use of these technologies or practices to detect or limit copyrighted music in posts or streams.

So it would -- defendant's response would exclude three or four things that we think are easily relevant. One would be tools that the defendant considered using but didn't adopt about copyright infringement of music. You know, the defendant's capabilities for reducing infringement are not just what they put into place but also what they didn't put into place, but perhaps what they were aware of. So that's

one item.

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Another one is what tools defendant is using to detect or limit copyright infringement outside of music. Maybe, for example, the defendant does something in the area of movies that it's not doing for music but easily could. But, you know, we're going to find out, because it makes much more money off of this uploading and streaming of music, it's not doing that other stuff.

So one is outside of music in the area of copyright, and the other is things that the defendant considered but didn't adopt.

And likewise, defendant has some policies about trademark and counterfeits, which, again, if there are some tools or monitoring programs that defendant's doing in the area of infringement that could easily be applied for copyright, that's something we'd be interested in and we think would be relevant. Again, by way of depth, we don't need, you know, detailed emails and all that stuff. We're talking probably about presentations, guides, summary-level documents.

And then I just mentioned things that the defendant would exclude by way of sort of subject area. The other thing I'd like to mention is something that's agnostic to the -- to the issue. Defendant makes reference to hate speech and other areas. We're not

interested in exploring what it does across its site as to all the trust and safety issues in toto.

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But one issue in this case, Your Honor, is the fact that defendants, if they do suspend someone, people sign back up under new accounts. And one thing that many platform providers have are tools that they use typically to relate accounts together. So if they ban someone and want to keep them off the platform, how do they figure out if someone's signed back up.

So this isn't specific to a given subject area, but if they have tools that help them identify and relate or flag accounts and users to see if they're signing back up, these are the kinds of things that would be excluded from the defendant's current proposed response.

As Your Honor indicated before, the Court already indicated that X's powers of monitoring and control over users and their posts is still relevant to the case even though vicarious isn't there anymore. And we're interested in the things I just mentioned beyond what defendant's offering to do because it's all relevant to whether the defendant took reasonable steps in response to the specific infringers and specific infringements that we've identified to it.

So it's not a platform-wide theory of

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liability. It's -- you know, it's what tools could they
have used or that -- you know, once we told them of these
issues.
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THE COURT: And you are -- just to confirm, you're interested in summary-level documents, not necessarily -- or not even including a custodian email search, anything like that. So what if they tell you there are no summary-level documents?

MR. ZEBRAK: Yeah. So I suppose then we'd be out of luck, but I find it hard to believe that there aren't such things. It could be a PowerPoint presentation. I'd imagine that, you know, the trust and safety group there probably has some presentations and guides and training materials that it uses to explain to its staff or to its business stakeholders about what it does and doesn't do.

You know, I think also, quite frankly,

Your Honor's request is a difficult one for me to answer,

in the sense that there will be plenty of areas where

custodian email searches is important to us in this case.

This area is probably not one of them, but --

THE COURT: I was only speaking about this particular --

MR. ZEBRAK: Yeah, yeah.

THE COURT: -- RFP No. 56 and related.

MR. ZEBRAK: Sure. Well, thus far defendant -- I mean, this would have been easy if defendant said -- you know, they're in touch with this trust and safety group and people in it. They haven't represented to us that these things don't exist. Their issue is we're not going to assess if things exist or burden because none of it's relevant. So we haven't been able to get past go on this.

THE COURT: So if we -- if this wasn't -- and it is not my preference to rewrite discovery requests in the context of a discovery hearing.

MR. ZEBRAK: Sure.

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THE COURT: It's like doing committee work at a board meeting. But if this was rewritten to state, summary-level documents sufficient to show or describe the tools, programs or methods, et cetera, would that —does that change the plaintiff's agreement to proceed with the revised request for production?

MR. ZEBRAK: It's fine with us, Your Honor. Our view on this is that we're interested in unearthing what they have and we're more than happy to cooperate on levels of depth on searching and if it turns out that there's a bunch of volume to it, but right now it's been — there hasn't been negotiation over this. So that would be fine with us, Your Honor.

Getting to the interrogatory, you know, we've asked for essentially people with responsibility or involvement with respect to the area we've just been talking about. And we've made --

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THE COURT: And so the difference is that they only want to ask -- they only want to provide details of people who monitor the site for copyrighted music. Is that --

MR. ZEBRAK: Correct. Again, not even copyright generally, but copyrighted music. And our view is the power of monitoring and control they have is broader than just on the issue of copyrighted music.

As to the interrogatory, you know, we're not — we suspect that lots of people touch this issue and we've articulated, we're looking for a name or two here to depose on these issues. And they've agreed to provide an org chart under RFP 44. You know, it doesn't match this language exactly, but it hits a bunch of the issues we've been talking about. And so, you know, we haven't understood why they provided the org chart but not the interrogatory answer which we'd, of course, need if there isn't such documents.

Unless the Court has other questions, I'd just move to the next set of --

THE COURT: No, I don't have any other

questions. Thank you.

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MR. ZEBRAK: So, Your Honor, again, the defendant's joint statement and the position they've been taking is that our discovery requests are consistent with the theory that the Court rejected, meaning that they're responsible for all copyright infringement that happens just because they know it happens somewhere, some way and that they allow music. That's not our theory of the case.

Our position on these economic requests is that what they can't do is withhold documents that reflect, you know, that their platform is riddled with music uploads, that the defendant promotes it, generates money from it, derives engagement off it, perhaps even gets into the different types of music uploads there are and indicates that this is what users want to do, but yet the defendant's going to withhold all that unless in those documents defendant recognizes and regards that the content and its activity or the user activity is infringing.

We just think that's a stunning position, and it -- you know, it really defies -- you know, we can't expect that they're going to -- first of all, they're not the arbiters of what infringement is or is (sic). I mean, it's relevant what they understood, but,

you know, we want to know the things they knew and the things they were doing, not just if they regarded it as infringement.

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You know, we're entitled to rely on circumstantial and direct evidence, and we think these requests -- I'm happy to go through them or some of them in specifically, but these all relate to their economic incentives. And -- you know, and we'll explain why the defendant acts the way it does in response to infringement notices. And, you know, defendant's awareness that massive infringement is happening we think is very relevant to the case, even if it's only going to be responsible for some of it.

The defendant has a little bit of slight of hand in their joint statement where they talk about how there are millions and billions of posts about music.

And they talk about that as if that's going to speak to the burden of this.

This document request, Your Honor, is about use of the uploads of music and the streaming of music in these, in these video files. It's not about discussion of music. You know, it's not about defendant's awareness that millions of users are discussing music. It's about the infringing activity. And it's also, quite frankly, about defendant's claim that, you know, these uploads

could be licensed by the user or owned by the user or de minimis or fair use. We'd like to see what their documents reflect about what they knew and were saying about the nature of these uploads.

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know, liability will hinge on the infringers and the infringements, but all these other documents or the context in which its happening and — will be very relevant to other issues in the case, including a need for deterrence and defendant's motives for why it's acting the way it did and the issues of willfulness as well as some of defendant's pled affirmative defenses, including fair use, where we're going to want to understand the nature of who users are and the types of things they're doing with music and what they want to do.

So -- and, again, we don't see this as an issue of burden either. We're -- we do recognize that many people may touch these issues, but that's where the parties often negotiate to something narrower in the scope of the search of the production. And we said we're happy to do that.

Again, you know, we would imagine the types of things we're talking about here, Your Honor, from past experience in litigations like these, are PowerPoint presentations, reports, consumer studies, surveys,

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     strategy documents where they're going to say -- and this
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     gets into the last set of requests in a moment, but, you
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     know, these sort of -- you know, these aren't
     communication-level documents.
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                  Does Your Honor want me to address any of
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                  THE COURT: I think probably you've
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     addressed all of the questions that I might have had for
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     you, but let me...
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                  With respect to Interrogatory No. 1, one of
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     the objections -- and leaving aside infringing, I'll
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     discuss that issue with defense counsel. But the use of
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     music, is there some disagreement over what use of music
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                               Well, let's, I think, get past
                  MR. ZEBRAK:
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                  THE COURT:
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                  MR. ZEBRAK: -- that's not the type of --
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                  THE COURT: And is that the issue that --
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                  MR. ZEBRAK: Well --
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                  THE COURT: Because it was not my
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     understanding that that is what you were -- my
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     understanding was the way you've just described it, that
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you were looking for uploads, streaming, those kinds of things. Not discussion about music, not, you know, comments about music, not critiques of music, that kind of thing.

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MR. ZEBRAK: Right. So, Your Honor, to that -- I think the issue here is that the defendant for discovery purposes wants to say that documents about use of music are simply not discoverable. They're not relevant because unless it's infringing use of music it's not relevant. And what it's trying to do is, we think, apply a cramped reading of Judge Trauger's motion to dismiss order where the Court indicated that, you know, all use of music isn't infringing use of music. Of course, that's not our position. But our position is, you know, much of it is.

And, in fact, you know, the -- we'd like to see what their documents reflect about what they know about the types of uses of music happening because, from our perspective, the things we indicate in the complaint we're talking about are uploads of music videos, commercial music videos or synced videos where commercial music is paired with video or concert footage.

It's not going to be the case that defendant's documents will necessarily tag that activity as infringing. And our view is we want to understand

who's been in charge of these issues and, you know —
that it's all going to be relevant to, you know, even if
use of music specifically doesn't establish the
liability.

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So -- so anyway, so that's -- that's, I think, where we stand on --

THE COURT: Well, if I remove the defendant's proposed I suppose — but maybe proposed is too generous a description. But if I delete infringing use of music and it's just use of music, is that going to resolve the issue with respect to at least some of these? With respect to Interrogatory No. 1 and maybe some others that if it's just use of music as was originally —

MR. ZEBRAK: Oh, Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- described --

MR. ZEBRAK: Excuse me. Yes, Your Honor.

That would — that would more than suffice. You know,
defendant's going to point out that, you know, that there
may be some lawful activity that they're doing with
respect to use of music. You know, for instance, I don't
know, partnering with respect to some promotional program
with someone. You know, of course — you know, there are
going to be edge cases and other things that, you know,
aren't going to go toward us proving our claim, but that
doesn't mean we sort of throw the baby out with the bath

water, as the expression goes.

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THE COURT: Well, and that's exactly the reason why there's a difference in standards in discoverability of information and admissibility of information because admissibility — it could be inadmissible for any number of reasons. Inadmissibility based on relevance grounds at trial is a very different standard than relevancy for discovery purposes.

MR. ZEBRAK: Right.

THE COURT: And I'll hear from defendant's counsel about that.

MR. ZEBRAK: Yeah. And I think the last thing here is, you know, defendant's going to point out that the Court said that the mere existence of a feature about music isn't a premise for liability. And that isn't our theory for liability here, but we do want to see what the defendant knows about actual uses of the feature. That's what we want to ask people about and see what the documents reflect.

So if I could, Your Honor, I'll skip the specific requests but be happy to come back to that later, if necessary. And I'll just cover the last set of requests here. We fully understand that, of course, defendant's going to have lots of documents about how it competes in the marketplace. We're not looking for all

of them. We're looking for documents where defendant is depicting its strategies and analyses about how it can make changes to its platform and what practices it can — it can engage in to be more like the licensed music sites that we've cited in our pleadings and that the Court cited.

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You know, from our perspective, again, we're not suggesting that they're going to be liable because they had this plan, but we think it's very relevant to the other issues in the case that the defendant recognizes that this activity at issue is going to be infringing because of the absence of these licenses. And it's courting the very same users that are uploading this music to other platforms because it's licensed there and they're courting these users to do the same thing on their platform, but because there's no license, it's infringing.

You know, those are the types of documents that the defendant would withhold. It would, under its proposed logic where it's trying to limit it to practices to promote infringement or infringing content, so the defendant — you know, if there's a document showing that its strategies to compete with competitors, you know, with respect to uploading and streaming of music, it would — it would withhold that as long as the defendant

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     in that document didn't say, oh, and we know that this is
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     going to be infringing content or that these users are
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     going to hit these issues that go to the other -- you
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     know, the other facets of the case.
                  THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
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                  MR. ZEBRAK: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                  THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from
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     whichever counsel on behalf of defendant, please.
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                  MR. SHAPIRO:
                                That would be me, Your Honor.
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                  THE COURT: All right. Come on up.
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                  Mr. Shapiro, is it?
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                  MR. SHAPIRO: Yes.
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                  THE COURT: All right.
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                  MR. SHAPIRO: And, Your Honor, I want to
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     echo Mr. Zebrak's appreciation to you for taking the time
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     to hear us on these.
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                  THE COURT:
                               Sure.
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                  MR. SHAPIRO:
                                And if I may -- and I've been
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     hearing you loud and clear and reading the tea leaves as
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     lawyers do.
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                  THE COURT:
                             Good.
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                  MR. SHAPIRO: But if I could take a moment
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or two to do a little bit of context setting --

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. SHAPIRO: -- and framing, just at the outset.

We are definitively not asking the Court to apply a smoking gun standard. That is — that is not our view. It is not our position. But I think if smoking gun standard is at one end of the spectrum of impermissibility, at the other end, equally impermissible, is a shotgun standard in which a party says, well, we just want everything. And that's the type of gun that we are saying would be improper to be used here.

And I think one of the most important documents before the Court right now is our Exhibit B, Exhibit B to the joint statement, because I think if -- if one were coming to this dispute or this hearing reading only the joint letters and listening to the statements of my brother, Mr. Zebrak, one might think that X is refusing to produce anything meaningful in this case.

THE COURT: I am not thinking that at all, Mr. Shapiro. I am pleased that this is not an argument about not producing any kind of information. And it's clear that X Corp has agreed to produce a wealth of

information.

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But a party's compliance with its discovery responsibilities, to some extent, even to a great extent, does not mean that that party necessarily gets a pass on other information that falls within the scope of the discovery rules. Because complying with your discovery obligations without dispute is what's expected of every party. And this is not -- not that I'm disparaging any kind of litigation that happens in federal court, but this is certainly not the simplest case that any of the judges in this court have before them. And, frankly, the discovery requests and the agreement to produce discovery in this case is not surprising to me, and it's not -- nor is it particularly impressive given the -- and I mean impressive in terms of me saying, oh, well, X Corp has agreement to produce so much information that it's not unreasonable for them to draw the line somewhere.

Because this is the kind of information, exactly the kind of information that I would have expected that a defendant in this kind of litigation, particularly one of the scope of business and resources of X Corp, would agree to produce with the issues that are before the Court.

So don't -- don't concern yourself that I'm under any misapprehension that X Corp is being totally

obstreperous in this case. If that was what you understood from my earlier comments, then I want to clarify that, that I do not think that X Corp is -- has strong-armed the plaintiffs on producing discovery of any kind.

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I think that you-all have worked very hard to -- to reach agreements about discovery that both sides agree is relevant and discoverable. And I think you've worked hard to try to come to some agreement about the remaining discovery, but I do think that there is -- there are a lot of resources being spent on this remaining discovery that -- that may not necessarily be justified, but I'm going to give you a chance to try to convince me otherwise.

MR. SHAPIRO: It's always worth a try, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It is.

MR. SHAPIRO: And I appreciate and acknowledge what you said a moment ago, which is, absolutely, the fact that we have reached agreement on some number of issues doesn't -- isn't decisive one way or another -- whether we're right or wrong on the remaining issues.

But there's another aspect to I think this Exhibit B, because I think what Exhibit B reflects, at

least in my view, is the extent to which the issues that are really at the core of this case, under the broad discovery standard of the federal rules, have been addressed and agreed to by the documents that X is already agreeing to produce. And most of what we're arguing about here are, on the one hand, I think going to be edge cases or edge points for the plaintiff's case but, nevertheless, would be asking X to dig through whole swaths of material for very limited potential benefit to the plaintiffs.

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THE COURT: Well, I'm not so sure that

Judge Trauger thinks it's of limited benefit. Of course,

I don't speak for Judge Trauger and she -- you know, if

this matter gets in front of you, she'll certainly tell

you whether any of us have correctly construed what she

meant.

But my reading of Judge Trauger's memorandum opinion is that she found it necessary to go to the extent of stating that they — that powers of monitoring and control over users and their tweets are relevant to the claim that she declined to dismiss and that the dismissal of the two other claims — again, this is my extrapolation of her order, but the two — dismissal of the two other claims should not be construed as a determination — in fact, she went out of her way to say

it was not a determination that information that might have been -- and I'm going to use the word directly in quotation marks, but more directly related to those other claims is not necessarily no longer relevant.

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There must have been a reason. I mean, judges don't ordinarily include comments, include expressions of their thoughts in their orders without there being some reason for that. And my interpretation of Judge Trauger's statements in her order is that she, because she's very, very bright and -- that she predicted that this might be an issue and she wanted to make clear to all of us, the parties especially, and anybody else who might be looking at it later whether that was me or whether it was her looking at it at some later time after she looked at maybe hundreds of other cases and no longer had immediate recall of this one, that she was not saying that the dismissal of those two other counts meant that information that might have been more willingly -discovery that might have been more willingly produced with those two counts remaining in the case was no longer discoverable. I think that she went out of her way to say just the opposite.

MR. SHAPIRO: 100 percent, Your Honor. And that is why, as reflected in Exhibit B, X has agreed to produce, for example, in response to RFP No. 7, documents

sufficient to identify policies and procedures concerning copyright infringement by platform users;

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RFP No. 9, documents concerning its analysis of the adequacy of its copyright infringement policies;

No. 10, documents sufficient to show policies, practices, procedures and processes, as well as related guidelines, training materials, interpretations of policies that X has adopted concerning DMCA notices and counter-notices;

RFP 15, documents sufficient to reflect and/or explain how X receives, processes and/or tracks infringement notices. X will also produce summaries and analyses of how X's system for infringement notice tracking is working, including any reports on deficiencies.

No. 20, documents sufficient to reflect the reactivation of services for any platform user whose account was permanently suspended or terminated pursuant to X's DMCA policy. X will also produce ticket data, case data reflecting suspensions, custodial documents.

I could go on, 20, 21 -- excuse me, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30. All of those are responsive to that statement by Judge Trauger about our ability to control and monitor the site. I think she doesn't want us coming in and saying "all of those things are off limit." But

the motion to dismiss order, which severely narrowed the case, has to mean something, I would submit, regarding discovery.

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So if the case now -- I'm not saying that this is the whole universe, but if the heart of the case, what the plaintiffs are asked to prove here, is whether X did one of these three things listed at the end of the motion to dismiss or in the order on the docket, No. 1, providing more lenient copyright enforcement to verified users, No. 2, failing to act on take-down notices in a timely manner, and No. 3, failing to take reasonable steps in response to severe serial offenders, it's pretty easy to see what discovery could and should look like in a case where those are the three things you're trying to prove. That doesn't mean that only documents or evidence going to those three things is discoverable, but that's the core.

And it is the plaintiffs, we feel, who are turning this into a needlessly burdensome and inefficient case. They are going to want to prove that we're providing more lenient copyright enforcement to verified users.

We are answering all of that. We're giving them all the documents on that. They're going to be asked to prove whether we're failing to act on take-down

notices in a timely manner. We're responding to all of that. We're giving them the smoking gun that they need if it's there. They're going to be asked to prove if we're failing to take reasonable steps with regard to severe serial infringers. We're giving them all of that.

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about some of your -- some of the defendant's position on these requests for production, Mr. Shapiro, is that there's -- at least the attempts at resolution have resulted in an acknowledgment by the defendant that you will produce some of this information as it concerns the use of infringing music.

Well, to me, that's even more burdensome.

If you're going to compile the information and then make a determination -- well, I think there's two issues, one of which is the one that Mr. Zebrak described, which is that whether it's proper for a party to -- for a defendant to make a determination about whether something is -- constitutes the very issue that's elemental to the case or at the crux of the case.

But even setting that aside and viewing this in terms of burdensomeness, it's even more burdensome, is it not, for -- if you're going to compile all of this information anyway for the defendant then to make a determination about whether that information is

infringing or not in an effort about what has to be produced and not produced. So I don't think that the burdensomeness is particularly -- a particularly compelling issue. Maybe -- maybe relevance.

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Although one thing that I do want to have happen is I want to see all of the discovery requests and responses because I don't have the specific interrogatories and requests for production that are not in dispute. I have the ones in Exhibit A, and then I have a general description in Exhibit B. But it occurs to me that there may be sufficient overlap in what — although you—all are very good lawyers. I suspect if there was sufficient overlap, we wouldn't be here today.

But it may be that what I find is that there is enough overlap in what X Corp has already agreed to produce in response to some other requests for production that what the plaintiffs continue to request is just superfluous or more of the same kind of thing. So I do need to see all of the discovery requests and responses. Can you go ahead and just file those as a supplement to today's proceeding?

MR. SHAPIRO: Yes. We're happy to do that.

THE COURT: Okay. And then I interrupted

you, Mr. Shapiro. Go ahead. If you can get back to

where my train of thought was, good luck.

MR. SHAPIRO: No, I certainly can. And I think you've characterized it in a way that's consistent with what we're saying here. And reason I started with this Exhibit B is we're providing most of it, at least in the ways that are relevant to the case already.

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But asking us to go and find everything relating to music or even uploads of music, whatever it might be, that anyone has discussed or considered at X Corp is simultaneous --

THE COURT: I'm not sure it's that broad, though. And I think that's where the sort of ships passing in the night comes in, Mr. Shapiro. I don't think it's everything that anyone may have discussed or considered. That's why I wanted to be very specific with Mr. Zebrak about what it was that was being requested and that it is these summary-level, not communication-level documents.

So that's something different. It's not a -- it is not a custodian records search. It is a wherever X Corp maintains summary-level documents, it's that kind of a search. And it's not every communication in which that might have been discussed or considered. It's, you know, what are the final documents that those discussions or considerations produced and not all of the work materials that went into the production of those

documents.

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And I do think there's a difference in terms of burdensomeness. There may be even a difference in terms of relevancy, but certainly in terms of burdensomeness with respect to those two kinds of documents. So that's why I wanted to be very specific with Mr. Zebrak about that. So I don't think that they're requesting everything that any person has discussed or considered with respect to this additional categories or topics.

MR. SHAPIRO: That's fair, Your Honor. I'm looking at page 23, this is our portion of the joint statement where we've prepared a chart. And I found when I was preparing for this hearing that our -- we've laid out in charts, you know, what the request and what our proposed compromise is on each of -- I find that's, in some ways, an easy way to follow it.

So I'm looking at page 23 of Docket No. 109. And the plaintiff's request was all documents and communications, including reports, studies, research, presentations, surveys or analyses concerning the use of music on the platform. And I hope that the Court can see — maybe it's now been narrowed orally by Mr. Zebrak, but I hope the Court can see why that's sweepingly broad and we feel not appropriate to the needs of this case as

narrowed by the motion to dismiss.

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and communications. But I think Mr. Zebrak has narrowed it. I think he did that before and I think he's certainly done it today and confirmed with me that it is summary-level documents, not communications-level documents. But I think where the real point of departure occurs is not what the kind of documentation is, but what X Corp is willing to produce, which is only with respect to some determination it makes of whether that is infringing music or not.

MR. SHAPIRO: So let me take a run at that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAPIRO: So there's the burden point and there's -- there's the relevance point. And Mr. Zebrak and his firm and I and my firm, we've been on opposite sides in cases sort of similar to this, and the fact is it is not at all unusual, unfortunately, sometimes for our clients, for there to be documents in which -- maybe the word infringing is a little narrow, we could change it to unauthorized -- in which there are documents or presentations in which a company's saying, wow, we've got a lot of unauthorized music. Or I've had a case where it was movies, we've got a lot of unauthorized videos up here. What are we going to do

about it? Are they drawing a lot of eyeballs? What should we do about this?

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In our view, we would produce that, for sure. Now, someone doesn't need to say, oh, I looked at this thing and I fear it's infringing. But there will also be lots of just discussions about the fact that — I'm guessing because I haven't looked at the documents, I'm guessing the way that Mr. Zebrak also has been guessing. But there will be documents in which people say things like, we've had a lot of people listening to music or people aren't listening to music.

And that's where we have a dispute. Their view is that's relevant, despite the narrowed nature of the case, it's within the realm of relevance because there's going to be a -- you know, a piece that leads to another piece to another piece of a story we're going to tell about X, I guess, providing more lenient enforcement (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Did you ask Mr. Zebrak that question? Did you say, well, what if a documents says there are lots of people listening to music or not listening to music and what are we going to do about that? Did you ask him, is that the kind of documentation that falls within the scope of what the plaintiffs are requesting?

MR. SHAPIRO: In meet and confers, maybe not that exact example, but, yes. In the meet and confers we said, well, you're just asking for us to talk about whether people like music on the site, and we don't think we should have to --

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THE COURT: And I think you've acknowledged that that's not inclusive in what they're requesting is whether people like music or don't like music, that it's something more than that. But I'll hear from Mr. Zebrak again and have him confirm that.

I mean, this is the whole point of requirement for you to try to resolve these disputes. And I will tell you that the frustration from this side of the bench — and not specific to this case necessarily, although there's some undertones of it maybe. But the frustration on the judge's part is that we get to a discovery, either a telephonic discovery conference or an in-person discovery conference, and it seems to be that there are two lawyers who are maybe saying, well, we're not that far apart on something or, you know, this is what we are saying we don't want to have to produce, and then the other side stands up and said, well, that was not what we were asking for anyway.

And I wonder -- I always wonder, why didn't you have that -- why did I need to be involved in that

conversation? Why couldn't you have that conversation and say -- you know, why couldn't you have just said to Mr. Zebrak, well, are you looking for these kinds of things of -- of a summary of here's what people are listening to or not listening to and what do we need to do to try to get more people to listen to X, Y and Z?

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I mean, there may be something in there that actually falls within relevancy in this case, but just to use your example. I'm just trying to figure out how far apart you really are on what should be produced and not produced.

And I'm not going to go so far as to limit it only to infringing music. And I understand that you're saying that maybe there's a better description because infringing has a very specific --

MR. SHAPIRO: It's legal.

THE COURT: -- legal connotation. And it is not up to X Corp to determine whether something is an infringement or not; although, there might be circumstances in which in monitoring of its own site it makes that determination, and that might be highly relevant to this litigation. But I'm not going to -- I'm not going to limit -- whatever I ultimately direct be further produced in discovery, it's not going to be limited to infringing music.

That's why I was trying to figure out if there is some use of music description that you could agree to. And I'm happy to have you-all have some more conversations about that and, you know, let me know if you reach an agreement about more of these discovery requests that are in dispute because now you do -- are both on the same page about what use of music means.

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MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, we would -- so I believe that we had floated unauthorized to the other side in meet and confers and they did not accept that, but I could be wrong and I -- we would absolutely modify our proposed compromise to unauthorized.

Where the gap between us is, even if

we -- even if we're no longer talking about the literal

language of the RFP, which asks for all documents, if

we're asking about just the use of music generally on the

platform, our view is that under the federal rules, under

discovery, the discovery standards, that is still outside

what is appropriate in this case, just generic

presentations or surveys about use of music on X in a

case that has been narrowed to these three main points.

Again, not saying those three points are the only things

that are the topics of discovery, but in that case use of

music generally is not a proper topic for discovery.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that the

scope of liability has -- of potential liability has been limited significantly, but that still remains that the powers of monitoring and control over users and their tweets and the economic incentives to tolerate infringement, including because of things like decision-making regarding licensing, those are all arguably, at least, components of the monitor and control and economic incentives of the outcome of what X Corp is doing or not doing for purposes of the remaining count in this litigation.

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I mean, I -- that's -- it should be no -- as you said, Mr. Shapiro, you're a good tea leaf reader and it should be no surprise -- well, you didn't say that, I'm saying that because obviously you are. And it should be no surprise to you that that's at least where I'm headed in this case is to find that these discovery requests with some maybe slight modifications -- and that -- are going to -- are likely going to be -- are likely going to proceed.

That's why I wanted to see, though, if this same information is already being requested in another discovery request, either an interrogatory or request for production, because if there's one thing I've learned about lawyers in the years that I've practiced and since I've taken the bench is if there's one way to request

something, lawyers are going to find five other ways to request the same thing and demand that all five of those have to be responded to, even though they ultimately produce the same information.

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So I want to see the other interrogatory requests and requests for production. And that's why I appreciate that you put together Exhibit B, because if X Corp is already agreeing to produce information that is broad enough, that it would include the information requested in these remaining disputed discovery requests, then there's really nothing left to argue about. You're already -- you've already agreed to produce those. So that's one possible resolution.

But if -- even if those -- even if the agreed-upon discovery is not that broad, I still think that there -- under Judge Trauger's decision and her reference to there still being discoverable information notwithstanding the dismissal of two counts -- and I agree with you, there has to be a point for her order. And the dismissal of those two counts of liability doesn't mean that the plaintiffs can put you -- can put X Corp to the same task that it would if there were -- if their original claims of liability were proceeding.

But just as you said, there's, you know, two ends of the spectrum of the shotgun approach and the

smoking gun approach. There's a whole lot of daylight between those two. And I think these discovery requests are likely going to fall somewhere in the middle, maybe not exactly as requested.

What I frequently do is give the parties some guidance about what I think is a more reasonable discovery request and then leave it up to them to go back and work out the specific parameters because, again, I can rewrite discovery requests, but I've got plenty of work to do that — without doing the lawyers' work for them.

So, go ahead.

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MR. SHAPIRO: So as you were saying that, I was thinking again about something you said right at the beginning, which is that it's not necessarily typical for a judge to include a sentence or two at the end of an order on a motion to dismiss about discovery the way Judge Trauger did. And what I believe Judge Trauger was trying to do there was to preclude us from coming in and saying — so the contributory infringement claim,

Count Two, remains. And that's one where she correctly, I think, applied the foster standard and said we had to have been doing something that affirmatively encouraged or fostered infringement.

And she didn't want us coming in and saying,

okay, because of that, you are not entitled to see, for example, documents sufficient to show how we track infringement notices or documents concerning the adequacy of our copyright infringement policies because that doesn't go to whether we're encouraging it.

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Exhibit B -- not all of them, but many of them. Because you could imagine if we were being super-aggressive lawyers and she hadn't included that sentence, many of these items listed in Exhibit B, we would be saying that's no longer in the case because you got rid of vicarious liability. And anything that has to do with economic incentive or monitor and control went out the window with vicarious liability.

Well, it didn't, and so we were not able, in response to a lot of these RFPs, to argue that they're no longer in the case, and that's why we've agreed to these. So that's how I think Judge Trauger's statement at the end of her motion to dismiss order can be squared with the positions that we're taking here.

I don't want to take up too much of your time. I wanted to mention just -- respond to one or two of the specific -- of course, to answer any questions you have, but one or two of the RFPs that were discussed by Mr. Zebrak because there's one on which I really hope

you're going to rule for us.

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THE COURT: All right.

MR. SHAPIRO: I hope you're going to rule for us on all of them. I don't want to be indicating that some are less important, but this RFP 56,
Interrogatory 23 about the -- the trust and safety teams.
Here we're not even trying to limit it to infringement.
We're just saying we should not -- because this would be burdensome. We should not have to go through and produce materials about what our trust and safety team, how it monitors because most of what the trust and safety team does, I can represent this as an officer of the Court, is not about copyright policies. It is about child porn, hate speech, disinformation from foreign actors, fraud, spam. It's huge, and there are all different kinds of tools that are used.

And I heard Mr. Zebrak saying, well, maybe there's a tool you use to filter out Russian election interference and that might be interesting to us because maybe we can argue that you should have used that in copyright or maybe there's something you use about child porn and, you know, we --

THE COURT: I'm not really sure that that was his argument. I think his argument was that is there something that you use with respect to, for instance,

copyrighted movies or other media, but not something that is a completely different consideration like child pornography or hate speech or antiterrorism, those kinds of things.

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Because you can be assured, Mr. Shapiro, that if that is the scope of what Mr. Zebrak is looking for, that's not going to be permitted. And if we need — if that means that the — the request for production needs to be written — rewritten or the interrogatory needs to be rewritten to make it clear that it is, you know, use of music only or we could say use of music and other entertainment media, I mean, I think there are ways to narrow that.

But I will agree with you that if what the plaintiffs are requesting is that you have to produce all the summary-level documents of your trust and safety team without regard to what the subject is of their monitoring, that's not going to be -- I am not going to allow that scope of discovery. And I'll hear from Mr. Zebrak about whether there's some way to rewrite this request for production and this interrogatory to make that clear, some further refinement besides some summary-level documents. I agree with you, and I don't think that was the scope, but if that was the intended scope, then you already win on that issue because it is

not going to be that broad.

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MR. SHAPIRO: All right. Unless Your Honor has any other questions, I'll cede the podium.

THE COURT: Not unless you -- no, I don't.

Thank you very much.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. Thanks.

THE COURT: Mr. Zebrak, let me hear from you with respect to that specific issue about the -Mr. Shapiro has now introduced a new phrase, the trust and safety team.

MR. ZEBRAK: Sure. Well, Your Honor, I'm going to address that specifically. And I do want to zoom out, though, a little bit at some point and reset where we are, because we -- it's not that we appear far apart. We are far apart.

And we've had -- I've been negotiating this discovery with them, I've been on every single conferral since the very first one in June. I've negotiated with a handful of Mr. Shapiro's colleagues. He then got involved after Judge Trauger had a conference with us in June, it was apparent that neither he nor local counsel were on any of the conferrals. I've since then negotiated these with him.

He's rejecting positions that the defendant knows are not our current position, Your Honor. I'm not

modifying these verbally here today for the first time. We've done this in conferral after conferral. We've done this in writing, including on submissions on this very matter. And it's -- I think it does a disservice to the distillation of these issues to have that kind of back and forth. I'd like to address a couple of specifics.

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. ZEBRAK: As to that specific request,

Your Honor, I meant what I said when I stood up the first

time and said, of course there's a spectrum of relevance.

And I believe I said we're not looking for everything the

trust and safety department does, and that the most

relevant subject areas were the ones involved in what

else they're doing for monitoring and copyright.

I indicated for copyright outside the area of music and I also mentioned trademark and counterfeit issues. And I also mentioned -- and I even specifically said we're not here talking about what they're doing to monitor for hate speech. So instead Mr. Shapiro used the example of election interference. Substitute in any one of a half a dozen other sorts of issues, Your Honor. That's not what we're here for.

I indicated it was the core subject areas that I focused on. I also said another issue concerns if they have tools that allow them to see if a user who they

suspended and said get off the platform is coming back. You know, and I said that that's not limited to a given category of speech. That's just a tool. And, you know, so as to those, I think we've narrowed them. I've done it verbally. If it'd help, we can redo the document requests.

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One of the things that the Court asked about, Your Honor, is for the parties to file the requests and the responses. And, of course, we're happy to do that. I also have multiple copies here for everyone if the Court wants paper copies.

But the issue is the discovery -- you know,
Mr. Shapiro's position is we ought not to comply with
these requests because we're doing -- we're acting
reasonably in response to other requests. And he
described this as an edge -- maybe not the word edge. He
said this isn't -- you know, that this isn't important to
our case.

These documents are very important to our case. And I'll go through that in a moment, but on the -- on the requests and the responses, the defendant would have pointed out if it was already providing any of the things we're arguing about in response to something else.

So I appreciate that the Court is willing to

undertake that work, but I think the defendant's already done that work by not pointing out — in all the examples Mr. Shapiro read aloud, Your Honor, those are not things sought by today's request at issue. Those are all about their specific responses and policies about what it does as to copyright infringement and notices and repeat infringers and policies. It's not the sorts of things that we're talking about today. So, you know, he cited a bunch of things that, yes, are very relevant, but it really amounts to — but I don't think there's anything in these other requests. I just wanted to point that out.

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And as to the other areas we're talking about, Your Honor, their position amounts to, because we can't do everything, we'll give you nothing. And, you know, we think we've shown relevance and we need something. And we've indicated the something that we're looking for, and that it's not sought by these other requests.

You know, the defendant has indicated that the case has been narrowed substantially. I'd like to address that, Your Honor. The lines between direct infringement and secondary infringement are -- can be very difficult to ascertain.

THE COURT: I think Judge Trauger's already

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     made that clear, as has the Supreme Court already made
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     clear --
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                  MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor.
                  THE COURT: -- they're very, very blurred
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     lines.
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                  MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor.
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                  THE COURT: Maybe blurred's not the right
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     word --
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                  MR. ZEBRAK: Right.
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                  THE COURT: -- they're not bright lines, at
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     least.
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                  MR. ZEBRAK:
                              Yes.
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                  THE COURT: And that's part of the
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     difficulty in determinating -- in determining, in
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     determinations about the scope of discovery is that the
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     lack of bright lines with respect to the different kinds
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     of infringement means that there's going to be
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     information that's going to be broadly relevant, even
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     though there's been a narrowing of the ultimate liability
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     issues.
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                  MR. ZEBRAK:
                                Right. Yes, Your Honor.
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     what I wanted to say on that front is that the lines are
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     murky at times not just between direct and secondary, but
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     also within the secondary, you know, as to which
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     doctrine, you know -- and sometimes conduct can violate
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more than one or it best fits under one. And

Judge Trauger's approach in the motion to dismiss was to
go with the doctrine that the Court deemed to be the

clear best fit to the case.

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But the defendant's approaching discovery as if we now have a weak case or a narrow case. Your Honor, this is the case that Judge Trauger thought best fit the allegations, which, as we pled, the defendants are liable for, you know, the specific infringers and infringements that we brought to their attention. That's the touch point for liability. But that doesn't mean that all this other stuff about their economic incentives — we're far apart because what they want to do is limit everything to just what they did in response to notices and what are their copyright policies. They don't want to get to their economic incentives and have come into the Court what they know about what users are doing with music.

Some of it's going to be infringing use; some of it won't be infringing. If it shows that it's not infringing, well, that will be something they want to cite to and, quite frankly, should want to get into the case. They claim it helps them to the end that they believe that not everything's infringing.

But much of it will be infringing. And it will be infringing whether or not there are documents

that talk about use of music breakdown, ah, here it was a commercial music video or here it was concert footage.

So it may break it down into those categories or it might talk about it broadly, but we are far apart. This is not an issue of a failure to communicate. This is an issue of the defendant having a very aggressive position on relevance. So --

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THE COURT: What about this offer of Mr. Shapiro to substitute the word unauthorized for infringement? Does it have any -- is it a -- what is the phrase, a difference without a distinction or a distinction without a difference? Does it make any difference?

MR. ZEBRAK: Your Honor, it doesn't.

It's -- you know -- you know, the defendant's being very aggressive in what it wants to constrain the evidence in the case to be. And, you know, our view is that if they have documents that are talking about how users want to upload music and they're promoting it, they're making money from it, they're drawing engagement from it, it may even break down the types of music that they're uploading. Ah, people are uploading concert footage or they're uploading synced videos where they take -- you know, pick Your Honor's favorite's artist and pair that song with some video that the person combines it with and

uploads it. Could talk about that sort of activity, could be a whole range of it.

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But the point is at some point if there's trial where evidence gets put in, Judge Trauger's going to deal with the Rules of Evidence and decide what comes But right now they're trying to block it all out of the case and say the only thing you get is if we internally acknowledge that it's unauthorized or it's infringing. Now, most defendants -- now, some of them do and this defendant may have internal documents where they acknowledge that users are engaging in a lot of infringement. Those are certainly relevant. But suffice it to say that many departments don't want to acknowledge that a lot of the activity that they're making money from and building their business on is infringing. So they're not going to want to use words like infringing and unauthorized.

So, again, if they're now arguing burden, which they hadn't done all along, this was all about relevance, they should be ordered to, in our view, make a production — and we can negotiate with them over the scope, but it needs to be informed based on them having some understanding of what exists, Your Honor. They haven't looked into anything. They haven't said it's too burdensome. They've just said it's wholly irrelevant.

You know, we're seven months into discovery.

We served these requests in May. Substantial completion of document production's due in mid March, Your Honor.

The parties are now actively negotiating over search terms and email custodians. We're now arguing on something that Judge Trauger already indicated is relevant. And we're not looking to push the boundaries on burden, but they're taking positions that I think Your Honor's already recognized, you know, actually are relevant. And, you know, the idea of us negotiating with them for months on stuff that we should have had long ago within what they've agreed to do, you know, we will, of course, do that, Your Honor, but we'd like to resolve these and move on as soon as we can.

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THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZEBRAK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Zebrak.

Anything else, Mr. Shapiro?

MR. SHAPIRO: Just briefly, Your Honor.

You might not be surprised to hear that I respectfully disagree with Mr. Zebrak's characterization of what has happened in these meet and confers. I've been on some and I've gotten reports on every one of them, and we've come out of them, and I believe my representations were entirely accurate, No. 1.

No. 2, the -- on the content monitoring,
Mr. Zebrak's up here saying, well, this is all, you know,
silly of Mr. Shapiro to say. It's in the RFP itself.
We've never received a narrowing, other than, well, what
we're primarily interested in. And we've come back with
a proposed compromise.

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No. 3, on these RFPs involving monetization or the -- excuse me, the example Mr. Zebrak gave about monetization, RFP No. 48, we discussed this on page 18, 18 out of 31 in the joint statement. I think -- yes, I guess they have -- it is on the docket page numbers, that is.

RFP No. 48, they've asked for documents sufficient to show or describe technical process by which ads are promoted, content are placed on the platform, et cetera. We say we are willing to produce documents sufficient to describe aspects of any algorithm or technical process for advertising that promotes or monetizes infringing content over noninfringing content.

I believe that's one of the ones we compromised on. They've accepted that. I think that suggests that a similar approach in some of these other RFPs and rogs should also be acceptable.

Finally, Mr. Zebrak made reference to problems -- their desire to learn about whether suspended

users can come back onto the service. That's one of the items that's already listed in Exhibit B. And as

Your Honor said when I was up here a little bit earlier,
some of these are items that have already been asked for in one way and they're being asked for in a somewhat different way. That's neither appropriate nor necessary. This item of suspended users and how they come back onto the site is already covered.

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THE COURT: Which one is that on Exhibit B?

MR. SHAPIRO: That is 22, documents

sufficient to reflect the reactivation of services for any platform user whose account was permanently suspended or terminated pursuant to X's DMCA policy. X will also produce documents reflecting policies and practices regarding any access that suspended users have to their accounts.

So for all of these reasons, Your Honor, I think that while we may have a disagreement about whether the case as framed in Judge Trauger's motion to dismiss order is a substantial narrowing of the case or -- as we believe, or inconsequential, as Mr. Zebrak was trying to suggest, it certainly has to be of some import. And I hope Your Honor will side with us on as many of these disputes as you see fit.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. Thank

you, Mr. Shapiro.

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Go ahead, Mr. Zebrak.

MR. ZEBRAK: Your Honor, first of all, I didn't refer to Judge Trauger's ruling as inconsequential. What you just heard is case in point for why we think we need a ruling on this, Judge.

Mr. Shapiro just referenced two pieces of discovery. So he said on Exhibit B, RFP 22 addresses the same thing that we were asking about under RFP 56 under the -- you know, under the tools and practices content moderation that we were talking about. That's obfuscation. One is not the same as the other.

RFP 22 that he has on this Exhibit B has to do with the defendant reactivating a service for somebody, meaning someone from the defendant's organization suspending them and then turning them back on or the person turning itself back on, maybe if there's a click-out or something. That's RFP 22.

That's different than the thing we were talking about in the first category about monitoring and control, where we were asking about tools the defendant may use to relate one account to a new account. For example, if it says I don't want this Zebrak guy on my site anymore and they have some flag or monitoring thing to see if Zebrak signs back up again, those are the kinds

of things we were talking about.

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The point I made before, I stand by, which is if the defendant in any way reasonably thought that anything that they've promised to do in this exhibit forestalled what we were moving on today, they would have raised it, and they haven't. And 22 is not something that addresses 56.

And secondly, I thought I heard Mr. Shapiro say that plaintiffs have agreed to accept -- so,
Your Honor, what Mr. Shapiro tried to do is indicate that our refraining from moving on RFP 48, which is something we resolved in an effort to narrow the issues for today, somehow means that we're willing to accept their modifying all the requests that we've just argued about with the word infringing. That is absolutely not the case, Your Honor.

We -- we agreed to remove four requests from today's hearing, Your Honor, that you saw through the ECF notice, but it's not because we deemed this modification of the request with the word infringing as an acceptable way to narrow the discovery that's otherwise relevant.

We did it recognizing that we wanted to narrow the issues for today and that, with respect to RFPs 47 and 48, we could use the combination of what's in the public domain about their system, which they themselves specifically

directed us to when they encouraged us to think further about this, with them agreeing to identify people in response to Interrogatories 22 and 24.

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But the fact that we negotiated a compromise on four discovery requests shouldn't be used to be held against us on all this other stuff that we think is just patently relevant. And we think it's obvious that it's relevant and we think Judge Trauger reinforced that and that the defendants just need to be ordered to do something here.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. ZEBRAK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Zebrak. All right. The Court's going to take this under advisement...

All right. I'm going to take this under advertisement and either issue one order, it may be a series of orders. For instance, if I give you some guidance about what I would find discoverable, I may, as I said earlier, direct you-all to submit proposed revised discovery requests and I'll pick from one of the two, which is one way that I've resolved some discovery requests -- discovery disputes before.

I do want to see the original discovery responses. Are those responses -- do the responses first

set out the request and then have the response so it's all in one document?

MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor. They do.

THE COURT: All right. And I don't need to see all the attachments. I just need to see the one document that has the request and then the defendant's response. But I don't need to see any produced documents, for instance.

MR. ZEBRAK: Right.

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THE COURT: So if you have a hard copy of that, you can give it to Ms. Fishman. I still want you to file it because I may refer to it, but if you have an extra copy, then it saves Ms. Fishman having to print it out and --

MR. ZEBRAK: Sure, I can — yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. If you can give that
to Ms. Fishman before we leave today. And then go ahead
and file it subsequent to today's proceeding, just do a
notice of filing as instructed today to file the original
discovery requests and responses all in one document, if
it's all in one document. If it's in two documents, file
it in two documents. But you understand what I'm asking,
Mr. Zebrak?

MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor. And, of course, that's fine. We'll do that as Mr. Shapiro

indicated we would. My only question is that, of course, for each of these there's then further narrowing that occurs back and forth by email and various writings, which I assume the Court doesn't want all that. We tried to create an abridged version of that in the exhibit that we prepared, which is very small.

THE COURT: Maybe what I need you to do, then, is to tell me which ones you've --

MR. ZEBRAK: Yeah.

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THE COURT: -- agreed to, at least.

MR. ZEBRAK: Well, it's not -- I mean, if we agreed -- it's more by way of the fact that, you know, of course, as the plaintiff, we don't know --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEBRAK: -- the proper nomenclature or the volume of what they have, so it's a request, they have their form responses, we then negotiate. Sometimes we'll then say here's what we're really looking for. I think the Court may want the benefit of that. We tried to create an abridged version of that in the chart that we attached with the joint statement.

THE COURT: Well, and I'm not going to -just to be clear to everyone, I'm not going to do -- I
don't know if it was you who described it or Mr. Shapiro,
but I'm not going to go through every discovery response

to compare to these and see if there's something that these might fall under. It was more a high flyover.

MR. ZEBRAK: Okay.

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THE COURT: So why don't you go ahead and give that to Ms. Fishman and file it. And if there's something else that we think we need to see to be more informed, to be fully informed, then I'll do an order directing an additional filing. That may be -- at least be helpful or it may not be helpful at all.

MR. ZEBRAK: Understood. Sure.

THE COURT: Provide that to Ms. Fishman and then file that as a notice of filing subsequent to -- as requested at today's proceeding.

MR. ZEBRAK: We'll do that, Your Honor. And what we'll also do is — obviously the defendant and plaintiffs still have different views about where this all should land, but we'll, of course, continue to discuss. And if there's a way we can resolve something, go ahead and submit some proposed agreement, we'll do that.

THE COURT: Sure. You-all know, at least have a general idea of where I'm likely to wind up. So you should continue to have discussions about whether there's any possible resolution of -- and, you know, if it helps to completely -- maybe not -- maybe rewrite's

not the correct word, but if it helps to completely wordsmith an existing request to conform to the course of conversations so that everyone's on the same page about what the most current --

MR. ZEBRAK: Yes.

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THE COURT: -- issue is, the most current request is, then you should go ahead and do that because sometimes it's just -- it just takes that. It just takes seeing something --

MR. ZEBRAK: Got it.

THE COURT: -- for the parties to be able to agree that, okay, that -- now we've gotten to the point where that does finally resolve all the issues.

So I would encourage you to continue to do that. We will get to this discovery request as soon as possible, but I cannot commit to you a particular time. I understand that discovery's ongoing, that you're coming to the end of the discovery period, that this dispute's been pending for a while, but it's new to me and it's being worked into all of the other matters that I have pending as well and some of which have been pending as long or longer than this. So we'll get it attended to just as quickly as possible --

MR. ZEBRAK: Sure.

THE COURT: -- but without any promises

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     about when that might be.
                  MR. ZEBRAK: Fully understood, Your Honor.
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     And thank you again.
                  THE COURT: All right. Thank you,
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     Mr. Zebrak. Thank you, Mr. Shapiro and all co-counsel.
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     I appreciate it. Your preparation, especially the
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     exhibits for today, is very helpful. And, again, we'll
     take this matter under advisement and get one or more
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     orders out just as soon as reasonably possible.
                                                        We'll be
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     in recess.
                 ***END OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING***
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 3 I, Roxann Harkins, Official Court Reporter for 4 5 the United States District Court for the Middle District 6 of Tennessee, in Nashville, do hereby certify: 7 That I transcribed from electronic recording the proceedings held on January 6, 2025, in the matter of 8 CONCORD MUSIC GROUP, INC v. X CORP, Case No. 9 10 3:23-cv-0606; 11 that said proceedings in connection with the 12 hearing were reduced to typewritten form by me; and that 13 the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate 14 transcript of said proceedings. 15 16 This is the 15th day of January, 2025. 17 s/ Roxann Harkins 18 ROXANN HARKINS, RPR, CRR 19 Official Court Reporter 2.0 2.1 22 2.3 2.4 25